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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

TARRELL M. HUGHES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 971686-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999); assault by prisoner, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999); interference with peace officer
making lawful arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305
(1999); driving on a suspended operator's license, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998); disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102(l)(b) (1999) in the Fifth Judicial District Court
of Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Can defendant establish that the trial court plainly erred in not making
a record of communications which allegedly occurred between a juror and the judge
during jury deliberations, where the record on appeal does not reflect that any such
communication occurred?
Standard of Review: Defendant's unpreserved claim is reviewed for plain error.
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). To establish plain error,
defendant must demonstrate that "(0 [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful" Id. at 1208.
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court plainly err by not making a record of three bench
conference discussions?
Standard of Review: (same as above)
Issue No. 3: Did defendant's counsel render ineffective assistance for not
requesting a new trial based on Juror Hafen's comment during jury polling?
Standard of Review: "When . . . the claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel] is
raised for the first time on appeal, [an appellate court] resoive[s] the issue as a matter of
law." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) (footnote omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rule is reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah R. App. P. 23B.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated assault and assault by
prisoner, each third degree felonies, interference with peace officer making lawful arrest,
a class B misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended operator's license and disorderly
conduct, each class C misdemeanors. R. 27-29. A jury convicted defendant as charged.
R. 97-99; 276:356-58. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive prison terms of zeroto-five years for the two third degree felonies, and accorded concurrent jail terms of six
months for the class B misdemeanor and 90 days for each of the two class C
misdemeanors. R. 128-35. That sentence was stayed, however, and defendant was
ordered to serve one year in jail and 36 months probation. Id. Defendant timely appeals
his conviction. R. 137, 161-62.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On 31 December 1995, Officer Matthew Stoker observed defendant driving east
on St. George Boulevard. R. 275:61-62. Officer Stoker recognized defendant and
remembered that his driver's license had been suspended earlier that month. R. 275:61 62. Officer Stoker requested backup, activated his overhead lights, and ushered defendant
to the side of the road. R. 275:62-64 158-59. Officer Stoker and Officer Doug Sargent
approached defendant and informed him that his license was suspended, and that he

l

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 2, 994 P.2d 1237.
3

would be issued a citation and allowed to leave provided he had no outstanding warrants.
R. 275:64, 159.
Upon being informed by dispatch that defendant had an outstanding warrant for
$250.00 in a civil case, Officer Stoker again approached defendant and advised him that
he was under arrest for driving on a suspended driver's license and for an outstanding
civil warrant. R. 275:65-66, 159-60. While Officer Stoker attempted to place handcuffs
on defendant, defendant became agitated, spun away from officer Stoker, and began
yelling obscenities at the officers. R. 275:6768, 160-61. Although the officers attempted
to calm defendant, defendant ran away yelling "Do you think you can catch me?" R.
275:69, 162. The officers returned to their vehicle, radioed for assistance, and pursued
defendant in their vehicles. R. 275:69-70, 162-63.
Defendant ran up the stairs of a nearby house and around the back. R. 275:70-71.
As the officers approached the house, defendant appeared on the front lawn. R. 275:7172, 163-64. Defendant continued to yell profanities while the officers repeatedly
encouraged him to cooperate with them. R. 275:71, 165-66. Then, the officers noticed
that defendant had an eight-inch pair of needle-nose pliers in hisrighthand. R. 275:72,
132-33, 163-65. Considering the pliers to be a deadly weapon, ordered defendant to drop
the pliers. R. 275:73. Defendant ignored the officers' orders and ran inside the house. R.
275:74-75, 166. Fearing that defendant would place the occupants in jeopardy, the
officers followed defendant into the house. R. 275:75-76, 166. Officer Sherman Steffens
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and Officer Michael Applegate arrived at the scene, and entered the house shortly after
Officer Stoker. R. 275:111-12, 138-40; 276:214.
Defendant ran through the living room toward the kitchen area at the back of the
house. R. 275:76, 167; 276:262. As the officers moved toward the kitchen, they
observed several people including defendant's ex-wife, in the house. Id. At the right
entrance to the kitchen, defendant turned toward Officer Sargent, who had entered the
house first, and raised the pliers toward the officer's neck gripping them like a knife in a
"fighting stance." R. 275:77, 167-68. Given defendant's threatening behavior, Officer
Sargent drew hisfirearm,pointed it at defendant, and ordered him to put down the pliers.
R. 275:77-78, 136, 168-69, 174. Clenching his teeth defendant stated, "Fuck you. Go
ahead and shoot me, mother fucker." R. 275:78, 124, 169. Defendant than turned and
went into the kitchen. R. 275:78, 169.
As defendant attempted to exit the left door, Officer Stoker applied a half-second
burst of OC spray into defendant's face. R. 275:79, 170. Defendant closed his eyes and
the officers tackled him onto the floor. R. 275:79-80, 170. After a brief struggle, the
officers were able to restrain defendant's hands, and eventually secure the pliers. R.
275:79-80, 126-27, 140-43, 145-46, 154-57, 171, 174. While defendant continued
fighting, Officer Steffens and Officer Stoker took defendant by each arm and escorted
him out of the house to the police vehicles. R. 275:79-81, 127, 143; 276:216-17.
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While the officers attempted to remove the OC spray from defendant's face and
clothing, defendant "reared back and kicked Officer Steffens in the area of his [left]
knee." R. 275:81-83, 172; 276:217. Officer Steffens immediately grabbed his knee in
pain and placed defendant on the ground. R. 275:83, 172, 183; 276:217. Defendant
continued kicking as the other officers placed defendant in ankle restraints and used a
rope to secure the hand and ankle restraints together. R. 275:83,173. When Officer
Steffens and Officer Stoker attempted to pick defendant up and place him in Officer
Sargent's vehicle, Officer Steffens fell, screaming that his knee had given out. R. 275:8384; 276:217. At that point, Officer Sargent and Officer Stoker promptly placed
defendant in the vehicle and transported him to jail. R. 275:84. Defendant continued to
struggle and curse even after arriving at the jail. R. 275:173.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I: Defendant contends that trial court plainly erred by not recording
communications between Juror Hafen and the trial judge which allegedly occurred during
jury deliberations. Defendant's claim originates from a colloquy between the trial judge
and Juror Hafen during jury polling wherein the court asked Juror Hafen if her verdict
was "guilty" and she responded "Because there was not clarification of one of my
answers, yes, it is — [inaudible] questions, I mean." However, defendant's claim is
primarily based on statements made by his trial counsel in a rule 23B affidavit which was
rejected by this court. Because this Court has clearly stated that a rule 23B affidavit may

6

not be used as evidence on appeal, defendant cannot show that any extra-record
communications occurred between the trial judge and Juror Hafen, and thus, that the trial
court committed plain error.
POINT II: Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not making a record of
three unrecorded bench conferences. Defendant fails to acknowledge, however, that he
bears the burden of preserving a record for appeal. In any event, defendant offers no
admissible evidence of prejudice.
POINT III: As grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant argues
that his trial counsel should have made a motion for new trial when Juror Hafen
responded to the trial court's inquiry during jury polling. To support his claim, defendant
relies solely on his trial counsel's inadmissible rule 23B affidavit. Accordingly, under the
first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant cannot
show that his counsel's inaction fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment.
Additionally, without providing any record support, defendant assumes that an
answer to Juror Hafen's "questions" would have dictated a different result. Thus, under
the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant fails to show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE DEFENDANT IMPERMISSIBLY RELIES ON
HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S RULE 23B AFFIDAVIT AS
EVIDENCE ON APPEAL, DEFENDANT CANNOT
SHOW THAT THE RECORD WAS INCOMPLETE,
NOR THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED
BY ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTING UNRECORDED
COMMUNICATION WITH A JUROR DURING JURY
DELIBERATION
Defendant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court plainly
erred by not making a record of communications between the jury and the judge which
allegedly occurred during jury deliberations. Br. of Aplt. at 2-3, 9-11, 13-19.
Defendant's claim is based on a single statement made by Juror Hafen during jury polling
and an affidavit submitted by his trial counsel which was attached to defendant's motion
for a rule 23B remand. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11, 13-19.2 Specifically, defendant argues
that Juror Hafen's statement and his trial counsel's affidavit support his contention that
"notes" or "critical papers" allegedly transferred between Juror Hafen to the trial judge
during jury deliberations, were erroneously omitted from the record. See id. Defendant's
claim lacks merit.3
Concurrent with this brief, the State has filed a Motion to Strike Reference to Rule
23BAffidavit From Defendant's Brief. In that motion, the State requests that all
references to trial counsel's rule 23B affidavit be stricken from appellant's brief. See
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998).
3

In his brief, defendant also cites various cases defining coercive jury unanimity
instructions. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-16. However, he concedes that "it is impossible for
8

After delivering a guilty verdict, the trial judge asked defense counsel if he would
like to have the jury polled. R. 276:357. Defense counsel responded in the affirmative.
Id. Then the court stated, "Members of the jury, I'm going to ask each one of you about
this verdict beginning with Miss Hafen. Miss Hafen, you've heard the verdict that has
been read. Was that and is that your verdict?" Id. Juror Hafen replied, "Because there
was not clarification of one of my answers, yes, it is — [inaudible] questions, I mean."
Id. The trial court accepted Juror Hafen's response as affirmative, and went on to the
next juror. Id. The record contains no reference to any questions or notes submitted to
the trial court. See record generally. See also Br. of Aplt. at 18 (conceding that "[t]he
pleadings do not contain any minute entries concerning the substance of the notes, or even
their occurrence.")
On 3 October 2001, four years after he filed his notice of appeal, defendant moved
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to remand for a determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel. A copy of defendant's Rule 23B Motion to Remand For
Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is attached as Addendum B.

[him], or this Court, to analyze whether the instruction contained 'certain inherently
coercive ideas', [sic] which might render it coercive, per se . . . and this Court, is likewise
prevented from analyzing whether the note is coercive under the circumstances of [this]
case." Br. of Aplt at 16. Because defendant concedes the impossibility of determining
whether Juror Hafen's determination was coerced, the State need not address whether her
statement during jury polling evinced any coercion. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, ^ 17,
999 P.2d 565 ("[A]bsent [discernable] coercion by either other jurors or the trial court, a
juror's ultimate assent to the verdict cannot be considered as adequate grounds for a
reversal.").
9

Defendant's motion was based in part on his claim that his trial counsel should have made
Juror Hafen's questions part of the record. See Addendum B. In support of his motion,
defendant attached his trial counsel's affidavit in which defense counsel noted his belief
that questions were sent to the judge by the jury during deliberation. See id. However,
trial counsel stated that he did not have any recollection of what those questions were, nor
did he know whether a record of those questions was made by the court. See id.
On 6 December 2001, this Court denied defendant's rule 23B motion. A copy of
this Court's Order is attached as Addendum C. Citing rule Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) and
State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290,fflf7, 11, 13 P.3d 175, this Court held that "[t]rial
counsel's affidavit states only that he believes questions were submitted, but he does not
recall what they might have been[,]" and that defendant's motion was "based upon
speculation and seeks to discover a factual basis for an ineffectiveness claim rather than
supplementation of the record with known facts." See Addendum C. Accordingly, trial
counsel's affidavit was rejected by this Court. See id.
Defendant now rests his appellate claim on the allegation in this very affidavit.
Affidavits supporting rule 23B motions are considered "solely to determine the propriety
of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary hearings." State v.
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998). On appeal, a rule 23B affidavit "do[es]
not automatically become evidence^]" Id. See also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, K 17,
12 P.3d 92 ("Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their appeals, including

10

the burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the record."). Accordingly, an
appellate court "will not consider [a rule 23B affidavit] or any reference to it in [an
appellant's] brief[]." Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 290. See also Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512,
513 (Utah 1990) (new evidence is not considered on appeal).
Here, defendant's claim is based wholly on the "notes" or "questions" mentioned
in his trial counsel's rule 23B affidavit. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-19. Yet, the record is
completely silent regarding any "notes" between Juror Hafen and the trial judge. See
record generally. Therefore, defendant's claim fails because a rule 23B affidavit, or any
reference to it as evidence, is impermissible in an appellant's brief. See Bredehoft, 966
P.2d at 290.
Moreover, where defendant's claim is based solely on unsubstantiated speculation
of the inadequacy of the record, he cannot show that the trial court plainly erred or that he
was entitled to a remand for a new trial. Although "[d]ue process 'requires that there be a
record adequate to review specific claims of error already raised[,]' . . . [an appellate
court] do[es] not presume error simply because a record is incomplete or unavailable."
West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f 11, 993 P.2d 252 (quoting State v.
Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App. 1996)). "Rather, lack of an adequate record
constitutes a basis for remand and a new [trial] only where: (1) the absence or
incompleteness of the record prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other documentary evidence); and (3) the
appellant timely requests the relevant portion of the record." Id. (emphasis omitted).
11

Furthermore, because defendant did not timely move for a new trial, he must
further show that the trial court plainly erred. To establish plain error, defendant must
demonstrate that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
In the instant case, defendant fails to show that the record is incomplete, and
therefore, he cannot claim that he was prejudiced, nor that the record need be
reconstructed. See Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f 11. Additionally, he cannot prove that
an error exists, that the error was obvious to the trial court, or that the error was harmful.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant offers no evidence that the "questions" referred to by
Juror Hafen during jury polling were either offered to the trial judge or were relevant to
defendant's case.
Further, defendant fails to rebut the fact that despite mentioning her unanswered
questions, Juror Hafen's answer to the trial court's poll was unequivocally in support of
the verdict. See R. 276:357 ("Because there was not clarification of one of my answers,
yes, it is — [inaudible] questions, I mean."). Indeed, Juror Hafen's remark about her
questions appears to be merely an attempt to explain the reasoning behind her vote and
thus provides no ground to reverse. See Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 15 (upholding convictb n
where juror expressed the reasoning behind her vote during jury polling). Accordingly,
defendant cannot prove that he was entitled to a remand for a new trial.

12

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT
PLAINLY ERRED BY NOT MAKING A RECORD OF
SEVERAL BENCH CONFERENCES FAILS BECAUSE
HE BEARS THE BURDEN OF ENSURING THAT THE
CONFERENCES WERE RECORDED, AND IN ANY
EVENT, HE CANNOT SHOW HOW HE WAS
PREJUDICED BY THE UNRECORDED BENCH
CONFERENCES
Defendant next claims that the trial court plainly erred by not making a record of
three bench conferences. Br. of Aplt. at 2-3, 10, 12-13. Two of the contested bench
conferences occurred during Officer Stoker's testimony, and one occurred after the close
of evidence and before the court's instructions to the jury. See Br. of Aplt. at 12 (citing
R. 275:85, 101; 276:316). Defendant, however, makes no showing that the missing
colloquy was prejudicial, rather, he simply claims that the absence of evidence is plain
error. See Br. of Aplt. at 2-3, 10, 12-13. In essence, defendant is asking this Court to
presume irregularity in the prior proceedings. Defendant's claim is frivolous.
"[This Court] do[es] not presume error simply because the record is unavailable."
State v. Morrello, 927 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah App. 1996). See also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208
(to establish plain error, an appellant must show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's
actions). It is well established that "[o]n appeal, it is the defendant's obligation to
provide supporting arguments by citation to the record." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^| 11.
Where a party perceives a gap in the record it may utilize rule 23B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, to remedy the missing record. See Utah R. App. P. 23B. "'If an
13

appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below/" Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11 (citing State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (additional citations omitted)).
In his Rule 23B Motion to Remand for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, defendant asserted that his counsel failed to assure that an appealable record of
all bench conferences was maintained. See Addendum B. However, this Court rejected
defendant's rule 23B motion because he failed to identify " a nonspeculative allegation of
facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a
determination that counsel was ineffective." See Addendum C; Utah R. App P. 23B(a).
Similarly, on appeal "defendant has made no showing that the colloquy was
defective and simply relies on the absence of any evidence, [thus, he] bears the risk of the
loss of the transcript and the resultant consequences." Morrello, 927 P.2d at 649 (citing
Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Utah 1985)). See also Roberts, 1999 UT App
358, f 11, 993 P.2d 252 (requiring an appellant to show that the absence or
incompleteness of the record is prejudicial); Russell, 917 P.2d at 559 (affirming
conviction and denying request for new trial based on two-hour gap in record because
defendant had not shown court that specific error occurred and that missing record was
critical to resolution of case); and Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208 (prejudice must be established
to show plain error). Accordingly, because defendant has failed to support his claim by
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citation to the record and appropriately remedied the gaps in the record, this court must
presume the regularity of the proceedings below. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11.4
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILS TO MEET EITHER PRONG OF
THE STRICKLAND TEST FOR INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Lastly, defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for
not requesting a new trial based on Juror Hafen's comment during jury polling. Br. of
Aplt. at 10, 19-20. Defendant's claim fails to meet either prong of the Strickland test for
ineffectiveness of counsel.
To show ineffective assistance of council under the Strickland test, "a defendant
must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
HI9, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (other
citations omitted)). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial-i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. 'The first
prong of the Strickland standard further requires that a defendant rebut the strong

4

In any event, the record reveals the harmless content of the three bench
conferences. The first bench conference was related to the State's offer of defendant's
driving record as an exhibit. See R. 275:85. The second bench conference concerned the
prosecutor's objection to the form of defense counsel's question to Officer Stoker on
cross examination. See R. 275:101. The third bench conference involved defendant's
motion to dismiss Count I of the charges. See R. 276:316, 354.
15

presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy."' Id. (additional quotations and citations omitted).
Here, defendant's only proof of that his counsel's performance was deficient is his
singular statement that "[t]he Affidavit of Trial Counsel... validates the unrecorded
activity during trial, and demonstrates the fact that these were activities he should have
objected to, and taken steps to assure that a record was made, for the benefit of an
appellate court." Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, as noted above, this Court "considers]
affidavits supporting Rule 23B motions solely to determine the propriety of remanding
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary hearings." Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at
290. "Once [this Court has] granted [or denied] a 23B motion, affidavits supporting the
original motion have served their purpose and do not automatically become evidence[.]"
Id. Accordingly, this court cannot rely on the unsubstantiated allegations offered in
defendant's trial counsel's rule 23B affidavit as proof that defense counsel's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment."
See id.; Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19. See also Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877
(Utah 1993) ("[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter
but must be a demonstrable reality."). Moreover, Strickland's presumption of
competence requires this Court to presume that trial counsel reasonably chose not to seek
a new trial. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19. Therefore, defendant's claim wholly fails
to meet the first prong of the Strickland test.
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Additionally, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
alleged inactions. Indeed, defendant's only proof of prejudice is his assumption that
"[h]ad the questions of Juror Hafen been addressed, or answered, a different outcome
could reasonably have been anticipated." Br. of Aplt. at 20. Defendant points to no
record evidence indicating the subject matter of Juror Hafen's questions. See Br. of Aplt.
at 19-20. Such speculation does not show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Martinez, 2001
UT 12, t 17, 26 P.3d 203. See also State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, (Utah 1996) (stating
speculative claims "cannot substitute for proof of prejudice"). Accordingly, defendant's
claim also fails the second prong of the Strickland test.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
defendant's conviction.
Dated this ID

faday of May, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cenify that on the (O^day of May, 2002,1 served two copies of the
attached Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, TARRELL M. HUGHES, by
causing the same to be [ ] hand delivered [xf] mailed, via first class mail, postage
prepaid, to his/her counsel of record, as follows:
BRENDA S. WHITELEY
Scarth, Dent & Whitely, PC
150 North 200 East, Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry offindingsof fact,
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true,
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be
filed within 10 days alter the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the
order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of
reasonable length.
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or
retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties
or upon the-court's motion.

(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the tnal court
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact.
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result,
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.)

ADDENDUM B

SCARTH, DENT & WHITELEY, PC
Brenda S. Whiteley (7016)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
150 North 200 East, Suite 203
P.O. Box 160
St. George, UT 84770
(435) 628-2884 Fax 628-2179
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

)CASENO. 971686-CA
)

Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.
TARRELL MCKAY HUGHES,

)RULE 23B MOTION TO REMAND
)FOR DETERMINATION OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
)COUNSEL
)

Defendant/ Appellant.

)

COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, Tarrell McKay Hughes, by and
through his attorney, Brenda S. Whiteley, and hereby moves the Court, pursuant to
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for an Order remanding the case to
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relative to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. This Motion is made on the following grounds
and for the following reasons:
1.

Trial Counsel for Defendant / Appellant was Court appointed counsel.

2.

Trial Counsel for Defendant / Appellant was replaced, following

the court ordered Temporary Remand, for the limited purpose of determining
whether Defendant / Appellant was entitled to new counsel on appeal, dated 15

September, 1998, over the signature of James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge, and bears
the paginated appellate record number of [R. 252-253] and is included in the
Addendum, attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities supporting this
Motion.
3.

Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant is also a Court appointed counsel, a public

defender, replacing five public defenders consecutively assigned to this case since
replacement of trial counsel, Douglas D. Terry, the public defender and original trial
counsel, by the Court ordered substitution of counsel, Tom Blakely, effective
November 24, 1998 [R. 262] copy attached to this Motion and included in the
addendum to the Memorandum.
4.

Defendant / Appellant is appealing his conviction, following a three (3) day

jury trial, on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5.

Appellant claims mat his trial counsel did not afford him effective assistance

of counsel in at least the following particulars:
a. A Mure to assure that an appealable record, of all bench conferences,
was maintained
b.

A failure to assure that all questions from the jury, during their

deliberations, were made a part of &e record and preserved for appeal.
c. A failure by Appellant's counsel to adequately answer, or object to,
Questions submitted bv the iurv. during iurv deliberations.

d. A failure of Appellant's counsel tofilea motion for a new trial based on
the comments, of Juror Hafen, voiced during the polling process following the jury
verdict.
e. A failure to object to the admission of Appellant's prior criminal record.
Appellant claimed that his prior criminal record had been expunged.
6.

The above allegations do not fully appear in the record on appeal.

7.

The Affidavit of Douglas D. Terry, original trial counsel, subscribed and

sworn to on September 19, 2001, a copy of which is attached to this Motion
supporting compliance with the requirement of non speculative allegation of facts
of Rule 23B(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, supports the above allegations
in part.
WHEREFORE, counsel respectfully requests that the Court consider this
Motion and remand mis case to the trial court for the entry of findings of fact
relevant to a Defendant's / Appellant's claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Dated this 3rd day of October, 2
rendai S. Whiteley [7016]
Attorney at Law

J

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY/FAXING/MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true, correct copy of the above and
foregoing document was mailedfirstclass, postage pre-paid on this"j day of
Qbk\\)A 2001, to: Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, for Karen A.
Klucznik, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.

rendaS. Wniteley [7016]

••inii :;CTRICTOOUKI

•SO NOV 25 PIT H 33
,y,^.:i--i .Yr;.'i£'..lHTY
BY

DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4158)
Attorney for Defendant
ISO North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
Pfc (435)628-4411

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff;

SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

vs.
TARRELL MCKAY HUGHES,

Case No. 961500003 FS

Defendant.

Douglas D. Tony hereby withdraws as couroei-fot DeJendanraxsr Tom Blakety
hereby enters his appearance as substitute counsel for the Defaidantin^ above-entitled matter.

rerry
Attorney at Law

r&C^C^
iBlakety
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on the ffi day of November, 1998, I did personally
deliver a true and correct copy of die above and foregoing Appearance to the Washington County
Attorney at 178 North 200 East, St George, Utah 84770.
Secretary

DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4135^
Attorney for Defendant
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435)628-4411

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff;

])

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS D. TERRY

I

CaseNo.974<586-CA

VS.

TERRELL HUGHES,
Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

]

)
S3.

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

I, DOUG£~AS D. TBKRY, being firtt duly twom depot* andjsay a* follows:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and represented the
Defendant as hia court appointed trial counsel in this case.
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein with the exception of
those matters asserted upon information and belief.
3. wnen Uie Jury returned ita verdict, r-&e Jury was polled. One of.xhc Juiuw, in
response to the quesUoa as to whether or not she agreed with the verdict, made a statement co the
effect that because her queation(s) had not heen ar*wered that she concurred with the verdict.
4. It is my recollection that a question or questions were sent to the judge by the

jury during deliberation. I do not have an independent recollection of what those questions) were.
5. I do not Vnow whether a record o f the question(s) propounded by die jury was

ever made by the court.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

On this r\

)

day of September, 2001, personally appeared before me Douglas D

Terry, the signer o f the above and foregoing iaotruiueut w h o duly ackaiowledged to m e thas he

executed the some for the purposes therein set forth.
NOTARY FUHUC
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Utah

IN TUB UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OCT8l2Mf
Stace of Utah,
ORDER
plaintiff and Appellee

C*a* Kc. * 7 i € M - C A

v.
Terrell McKay Hughea.
Defendant end Appellant

Thie matter la before the court upon appellant'a motion,
filed September IS, 2coi, for enlargement ot time to file
appellant'a brief. Appellee filed a reepona* ir. ofpetition to
appellant 1 a motion.
Appellant'a brief wee originally due May 29, 2001. On June
f, 2001. appellant'a notion to aupplcment the record *ae denied,
and appellant wae given 20 additional day* to file the brief. On
June 21, 2001, appellant vac granted a 30-day extenaion tc July
20, 2001, to fila her brief. On July 23, 2001, appellant was
granted until Auguet 20. 2031, to file appellant*a brief. On
September S, 200l, appellant vae ordered and directed by thie
court to file appellants brief on cr before September 19, laoi
Ifoftt, tke eyytllaAt requeeta an acditloaal extenaion of time tc
October S, 2001, to file eppellant'e brief,
Nov, therefore, XT IS HSftSBY ORDERTO the appellant ie
granted a final extcealoa ta oer«%w*jr *. aooj. r«iiu4« I Q r u e
*pp»uanc*e brief intnin the prescribed tim* p***** will Le
regarded ee contempt of thin court, and an order tc ebow tm^$^
hearing will be acLeriuled.
oeted thle j r ^ day of October, 2001.
FOI Til COURT;
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State of Ucah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

ORDER
Case No. 971686-CA

Tarrell Hughes,
Defendant and Appellant.

This case is before the court on a motion to remand for
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to
Utah R, App. p, 23B. ApP«lleat appeals hi*.conviction on the
basis of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel who also
represents him on appeal* A "requirement to hearing an
ineffectiveness of counsel claim on a direct appeal is that the
defendant must be represented by new counsel on appeal because it
is •unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of
his own ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" state v.

Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah ct. App.), cert, denied, eso
P.2d 943 (Utah 1Q«*1 (ejn^lnct Jtni^h v ^ t ^ . 795 p.2d 619, 621
(Utah 1989) * Appellant in this case is not represented by new
counsel on appeal; accordingly! it is inappropriate to consider
the taction for remand pending resolution of the issues relating
to appellant's representation on appeal.
IT IS RERSBY ORDERED that the motion for remand under Utah
R. App. P. 238 is denied, without prejudice, and the case is
temporarily remanded to the triaL. court for the limited purpose
of determining whether appellant is entitled to new counsel on
appeal.
Dated this

day of September, 1998*

.COURT:

g Judge
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ADDENDUM C

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Utah Court ot Appeals

DEC ? 3 2001

00O00
C!e.x of tm Cou«t

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

v.
Case No. 971686-CA
Tarrell McKay Hughes,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis.
Appellant seeks a remand under Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure for entry of findings of fact necessary for
determination of his ineffectiveness of counsel claim.
A Rule 23B motion must be based "upon a nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal,
which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was
ineffective." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). "The motion shall include
or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully
appealing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient
performance of the attorney" and "also allege facts that show the
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). The
court has stated that fl[t]he purpose of Rule 23B is for appellate
counsel to put on evidence he or she now has, not to amass
evidence that might help prove an ineffectiveness of counsel
claim." State v. Johnston. 2000 UT App 290, 17, 13 P.3d 175.
Accordingly, Rule 23B cannot "be used as a discovery tool rather
than as a means to make a record of facts now known to defendant
which bear on his ineffective assistance claim, but which do not
otherwise appear of record." Id. at 111.
The present motion and supporting affidavit do not satisfy
Rule 23B's requirements. Appellant has not identified facts that
would support his ineffectiveness claim and resulting prejudice.
Appellant has not set out the content of any questions allegedly
submitted by jurors and/or the response thereto. Trial counsel's
affidavit states only that he believes questions were submitted,
but he does not recall what they might have been. The motion is
based upon speculation and seeks to discover a factual basis for
an ineffectiveness claim rather than supplementation of the
record with known facts. Similarly, the motion does not set
forth the content of any bench conferences allegedly omitted from
the record. Finally, there is no record support for the claim
that trial counsel allowed appellant's criminal record to be
admitted into evidence at trial. Use of the criminal record in

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that or. December 5, 2001, a true and correct
copy of one foregoing ORDER r*as deposited in the Uniced States
mail ~ o *" n e o a r c i e s listed '^ e 1 o w i
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
BRENDA WHITELEY
SCARTH & DENT
150 N 200 E #203
PO BOX 160
ST GEORGE UT 8 4770
Dated this December 6, 2001.
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